Risk Assessment: 2025 Bourbon Street New Years Day Attack

How Did This Tragedy Occur and What Made it Possible?

Introduction

Bourbon Street in New Orleans is world renowned for its vibrant and lively atmosphere, making it a must-visit destination for travelers seeking an unforgettable experience. Bourbon Street's combination of rich history, unique architecture, electrifying atmosphere, vibrant nightlife, and culinary delights make it an attractive destination for visitors from around the world. These qualities bring large crowds for holiday celebrations, which also make it an attractive target for terrorist activity, as occurred on New Years Day 2025.

This risk assessment of the terrorist attack on Bourbon Street is based on the NIST 800-30 framework. The event is classified as a Tier 2 attack on Common Infrastructure and Disruption of Business and Tourism in the New Orleans French Quarter.

The data used for this assessment is gathered from the Open Source Intelligence items at the bottom of this opinion commentary.

Asset to Protect

Bourbon Street is in the historical French Quarter district of New Orleans, Louisiana, recognized worldwide as an entertainment and culinary destination. Its many attractions include the legendary Preservation Hall which is known for its house band, a record label, and a non-profit foundation all supporting Jazz music; Café Du Monde, Pere Antoine, Tableau Restaurant, Toulouse Dive Bar, and other notable eateries and destinations. In 2022, New Orleans hosted more than 17.5 million visitors, with tourism generating an estimated $9.1 billion in revenue, according to the New Orleans and Company non-profit group. The New Orleans French Quarter is a substantial public asset to be protected.

Threat Identification

Terrorist groups and radicalized individuals are the main Threat Actors. In this case, a single individual carried out the attack: Shamsud-Din Jabbar, a United States citizen from Texas. He served in the Army from March 2007 to July 2020, after briefly enlisting in the Navy’s delayed entry program. The FBI assesses that Mr. Jabbar became radicalized online and pledged allegiance to ISIS, the Islamic State terrorist organization. FBI evidence supporting this assessment include an ISIS flag found in the vehicle used in the attack and his online media consumption history.

Mr. Jabbar visited New Orleans In October and November 2024 to surveil the area. During his October visit he recorded himself riding a bicycle through Bourbon Street wearing Ray-Ban Meta smart glasses which included a tiny video camera in the frame with an ultra-wide field of view and 12MP resolution. The video recordings he made provided vulnerability information used for planning his New Years 2025 attack.

Mr. Jabbar drove from Houston, Texas to Gonzales, Louisiana where he rented a Ford F-150 Lightning electric truck and drove to a house he rented in New Orleans. He brought with him two coolers and one luggage style hand truck, detonators, and a supply of high explosive RDX. He placed the explosives, and detonators into the coolers then wired the devices to create a pair of portable improvised explosive devices (IED's). He left the rental house and drove to the French Quarter of New Orleans with the two IED's.

Upon arrival at 12:41 a.m., he parked his truck, and walked to Royal Street and Governor Nichols Street. At 1:53 a.m., surveillance cameras captured Mr. Jabbar placing the first IED at Bourbon Street and St. Peter Street corner. Bystanders apparently moved the IED out of the congested foot traffic pathway to another location one block to Orleans Street. At 2:20 a.m., another camera captured Mr. Jabbar placing the second IED at Bourbon and Toulouse Street. IED's in place, Mr. Jabbar returned to his rented pickup truck.

The FBI and ATF assesses Mr. Jabbar's placement of explosives at populated intersections on Bourbon Street were intended to cause mass human casualties and catastrophic property damage.

Vulnerability Identification & Predisposing Conditions

Since at least 2020, city officials have studied how best to replace New Orleans’ failing system of street barriers to protect people and property against vehicle attacks.

Multiple vulnerabilities were identified by Mr. Jabbar:

• Bourbon Street is open to regular vehicle traffic for much of the day, requiring city officials to block parts of it off from surrounding streets each evening and during events.

• The city had no bollards at Canal and Bourbon Streets, where the attacker entered. On New Year’s Day, the roadway was blocked by an SUV police cruiser parked sideways.

• Two of the Bourbon Street attack scenarios modeled by city-contracted engineers involved a vehicle entering the street in a straight line, without turning, after building up speed.

• The city initially chose a bollard system called the Heald HT2-Matador that allowed workers to slide the barriers into position along tracks in the street. The Heald HT2-Matador barriers proved problematic under the rigors of Bourbon Street, and were often inoperable because the tracks became jammed with litter including Mardi Gras bead necklaces.

• Officials subsequently chose a bollard system rated for 10mph impacts from a company called 1-800-Bollards Inc. According to city bidding documents, dated in August and September. The city’s April engineering analysis describes the product as having an “S10” crash rating and explains it can stop a 5,000lb vehicle traveling 10mph.

Several predisposing conditions, unknown to Mr. Jabbar, contributed to his attack's Likelihood of Success.

• The city’s security planning emphasized the difficulty all cities face in protecting against vehicle attacks while preserving access to routine vehicle and pedestrian traffic, including accessible sidewalks for people with disabilities.

• During major events, such as New Year’s or Mardi Gras, city security plans call for parking large vehicles at the ends of streets that are most vulnerable to high-speed vehicle attacks.

• The city’s security modeling, in an engineering study conducted to help choose a new barrier system, had only considered scenarios where a vehicle entered Bourbon Street on the roadway – not the sidewalk, as was done by Mr. Jabbar in his Ford F-150 truck.

• The primary concern of city officials, along with French Quarter resident and business representatives, was protecting pedestrians from vehicles turning onto Bourbon from side streets at lower speeds.

• The system ultimately chosen by the city received a deduction in its “safety rating” score because it did “not meet the project requirements specified”. It received higher marks for the weight of the bollards and their low costs and ease of operation.

Risk Analysis

Likelihood of Occurrence - HIGH Likelihood

The Likelihood of Occurrence of an attack on a populated public event, such as the New Orleans French Quarter Bourbon Street area, is considered HIGH, a qualitative assessment used by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in its Homeland Threat Assessment 2024.

High Likelihood is attributed to this attack due to the symbolic nature of Bourbon Street in American culture. Music, dancing, use of alcohol, and revelry are anathema to adherents and sympathizers of the terrorist Islamic State. Striking such a target would be in line with their attacks on similar environments where Westerners were celebrating. The FBI assesses that Mr. Jabbar had been radicalized online, pledged allegiance to the Islamic State militant group, and was sympathetic to their cause.

Inadequate attack scenario modeling by the City and inadequate selection and deployment of protective measures played a significant role in the success of Mr. Jabbar's attack on Bourbon Street. The city modeled scenarios for how an attacker could enter Bourbon Street at various intersections in a crew-cab Ford F-150. Engineers found such a pickup could enter the crowded tourist strip at speeds ranging from 12-70mph. Two of the Bourbon Street attack scenarios modeled by city-contracted engineers involved entering the street in a straight line, without turning, after building up speed.

Mr. Jabbar drove a deadlier weapon than the truck used in the report’s scenarios: a newer F-150 Lightning, a much faster, heavier and quieter electric vehicle. His attack bypassed barriers and vehicles parked sideways by driving up onto the sidewalk where he struck and killed several people. His actions demonstrated the inadequacy of the City's planning, selection, and deployment of protective devices.

During the exchange of gunfire between Mr. Jabbar and law enforcement responders, in which his was fatally wounded, he was unable to detonate the IED's. The ATF assesses that Mr. Jabbar had insufficient expertise with explosives: he had incorrectly wired the detonators to the IED's and, when he attempted to trigger them, they failed.

Impact Analysis - SEVERE Impact on Public Safety, Economic Stability, and Tourism Industry

Mr. Jabbar placed high explosive IED's at crowded intersections in a city neighborhood with buildings over 100 years old, some dating back to the 18th and 19th centuries. Not only would powerful IED detonation cause mass human casualties, many of the centuries-old buildings would likely suffer catastrophic damage and potentially collapse, causing scores of fatalities and numerous injuries.

After human loss of life is considered, many businesses in the French Quarter could see decreases in business and employment due to years of rebuilding required. It is a reasonable conclusion to draw that tourism to the area would decrease until substantial rebuilding is completed. Mr. Jabbar's errors prevented further casualties, property damage, and loss of business.

Risk Mitigation Strategies

• Lessons Learned: Conduct a blameless process to ensure all factors contributing to the Mr. Jabbar's successful attack are known and documented.

• Enhance Infrastructure: Complete the installation of street barriers with higher crash ratings; invest in modernizing infrastructure.

• Improve Surveillance: Implement advanced surveillance systems and regular monitoring.

• Training and Coordination: Provide comprehensive training for emergency responders and improve inter-agency coordination, including acquisition and processing of terrorist threat intelligence. Model additional scenarios which include lessons learned from Mr. Jabbar's attack.

• Building Inspections: identify historic buildings that could suffer catastrophic damage; engage building owners to create upgrade plans and reinforce the structures.

Risk Monitoring and Review

• Continuous Monitoring: Implement continuous monitoring of threats and vulnerabilities. This requires enhanced partnerships with state and Federal law enforcement agencies to acquire and act upon intelligence regarding terrorist threats.

• Regular Reviews: Conduct regular risk assessments and updates to ensure their relevance and effectiveness are current.

• Consider a continuous risk review cycle: ongoing identification, assessment, risk control strategies, monitoring, and reporting of risks in a common dashboard for ongoing review.

Open Source Intelligence Sources

• Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data on Domestic Terrorism - 2023, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2023, https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/fbi-dhs-domestic-terrorism-strategic-report-2023.pdf/view

• Homeland Threat Assessment 2024, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2024, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-09/23_0913_ia_23-333-ia_u_homeland-threat-assessment-2024_508C_V6_13Sep23.pdf

• Federal Bureau of Investigation, 01 Jan 2025, FBI Statement on the Attack in New Orleans [Press Release], https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-statement-on-the-attack-in-new-orleans

• Federal Bureau of Investigation, 01 Jan 2025, Bourbon Street Attack Investigation Updates [Web Site], https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/bourbon-street-attack-investigation-updates

• "The Bourbon Street attack was part of a new pattern." The Economist, Online Edition (soft paywall), 02 Jan 2025. https://www.economist.com/united-states/2025/01/02/an-attack-in-new-orleans-raises-fears-about-islamic-state

• Federal Bureau of Investigation, 02 Jan 2025, Investigative Updates on the New Orleans Bourbon Street Attack [Press Release], https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/investigative-updates-on-the-new-orleans-bourbon-street-attack

• Reed, Betsy. "New Orleans’ planned barriers only designed to withstand crashes of 10mph." The Guardian, US Edition, 05 Jan 2025. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/jan/05/new-orleans-street-barriers-safety

• Federal Bureau of Investigation, 05 Jan 2025, Investigative Updates on the New Orleans Bourbon Street Attack [Press Release], https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/investigative-updates-on-the-new-orleans-bourbon-street-attack-010525

• Reed, Betsy. "New Orleans attack victim’s fiancée condemns city over security failings." The Guardian, US Edition, 06 Jan 2025. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/jan/06/new-orleans-attack-victims-security

• Hashi, Asad. "The French Quarter: New Orleans' Historic, Beating Heart." Barron's, 01 Jan 2025, https://www.barrons.com/news/the-french-quarter-new-orleans-historic-beating-heart-a000ef0a

• Schogol, Jeff. "Here is the military service record for the New Orleans attack suspect." Task & Purpose, 01 Jan 2025, https://taskandpurpose.com/news/military-jabbar-new-orleans-record/